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Abstract—Online social networking and corresponding mobile
based applications are gaining popularity and now considered
a well-integrated service within mobile devices. Basic security
mechanisms normally based on passwords for the authentication
of social-network users are widely deployed and poses a threat
for the user security. In particular, for dedicated social groups
with high confidentiality and privacy demands, stronger and user
friendly principles for the authentication and identification of
group members are needed. On the other hand, most of the
mobile units already provide strong authentication procedures
through the USIM/ISIM module. This paper explores how to
build an architectural framework for secure enrolment and
identification of group members in dedicated closed social groups
using the USIM/SIM authentication and in particular, the 3GPP
Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA), which is built upon
the USIM/SIM capabilities. One part of the research is to
identify the marketable use-cases with corresponding security
challenges to fulfil the requirements that extend beyond the online
connectivity. This paper proposes a secure identification design
to satisfy the security dimensions for both online and offline
peers. We have also implemented an initial proof of the concept
prototype to simulate the secure identification procedure based
on the proposed design. Our implementation has demonstrated
the flexibility of the solution to be applied independently for
applications requiring secure identification.
Keywords—Mobile Social Networks, Information Security, Se-
cure Identification.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Online social networking like Facebook and Twitter has
brought revolution towards social life by facilitating interaction
with old friends, sharing of events, distribution of data and var-
ious other aspects of social life. Mobile based social networks
like GyPSii, Brightkite, Loopt provide some exclusive features
like short messaging notification, maps and location based
services etc. Indeed, most of the popular social networking
websites are transforming into mobile domain by offering
exciting applications and games exclusively designed for users
on the go. However, current social networking applications are
rather streamlined. Furthermore, the major goal seems to be
to get as many users as possible within the network and this
is also the major figure used by analytics firms [1]. Whether
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the existing online social networks would be able to sustain
continuing popularity is a highly debatable issue but there is
an agreement in broader sense that the current open trend
would be shifted towards closed user groups in the coming
decade [2].
In this paper, we focus on these so called closed social
network groups. In a closed group, there is no need to ”find
anybody” in the country or the world in the network, but
the important thing is to attract high end smart phone users
by offering small and ”closed” dedicated existing network.
The groups can be created, modified or deleted by the users
targeting specific community having common interest in short
or long term. Hence, the groups would have restricted mem-
bership along with role based security set by moderator of
that specific group. The closed community could be anything
from an enterprise project team to a religious community or
the like. As compared to typical social networks, we have
high security requirements for the schemes used to identify
and communicate between members within a group as well
as between members from different groups. Typically, the
security offered at most social networking sites is simple login
protection based on usernames and passwords and users are
forced to remember login credentials or to write them down.
Moreover there is a common tendency among users to store
private and sensitive data on their mobile phones as compared
to typical personal computer like contacts, passwords, bank
account details, updated calendar entries with key dates and
personal notes. Hence for mobile based social groups, there
is a need for user friendly as well as more secure methods to
enrol new members into the group.
Mobile based communications are considered to be fairly
safe and trusted by end-users and most mobile units already
provide strong authentication through the USIM/SIM or ISIM
module. Thus, it would be efficient to utilize the existing
authentication possibilities provided by these modules and
corresponding standards while designing solutions for strong
authentication in close environments. The security design pro-
vided in this paper is an effort to probe and improve the exist-
ing key-exchange mechanisms for USIM, ISIM environments
to provide secure identification in mobile social networks. The
main contributions of the parer are the following:
 We provide a secure identification architecture based on
the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) Generic
Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) [3] that can be used to
securely enroll members to a closed mobile social group
or to identify members in the group. Our architecture is
based on the assumption of the existence of a Mobile So-
cial Networking Portal (MSNP) responsible for enrolling
online members.
 We provide a new user friendly scheme, compatible
with the suggested identification architecture for securely
enrolling member within close proximity using short
range wireless technologies.
 We have made a prototype implementation in order to
verify the proposed security architecture and schemes.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the
fashion industry use case and state of the art. Some notations
and design limitations are discussed in Section III. Section
IV provides our secure identification design with different
scenarios. Section V discusses the prototype implementation
for this paper followed by discussions on its security analysis
in Section VI. Finally, we conclude in Section VII.
II. PRELIMINARY
In order to illustrate the security challenges addressed within
this paper, we discuss a social networking use case related to
closed environment below. We use this use case to identify se-
curity requirements and usability aspects that should be taken
into account for the secure architecture design. Moreover,
we give and overview of the 3GPP Generic Authentication
Architecture (GAA) [4]. Finally, we discuss device pairing
protocols and their applicability with respect to creating initial
social network security association utilizing physical proximity
between peers.
A. A Fashion Industry Use-case
We consider a modeling company having staff comprising
of managers, marketing personals, dress designers, chore-
ographers, beauticians, photographers, models, office staff,
etc. The company works in close co-operation with certain
media groups and enterprises for marketing their products
and arranges various events and fashion shows funded by
enterprises. The company would certainly benefit by having
a closed mobile based social network, i.e. comprising of only
directly invited members after strong authentication, which can
become the backbone for its operations at fashion events. The
prime focus of the event manager is to make sure that every
person involved in the event organization should be aware of
its tasks both prior to the event and during the event. The portal
will help the event manager to announce the description of
event, status and availability of models, post event discussions,
etc. The prime interests related to the services offered to these
groups could be:
 Event Announcements and Schedule Updates
 Calendar Sharing
 Location Based Services
 Shows Details (Ramp Numbering etc.)
 Document Sharing
 Media Sharing
 Post event Comments
The event manager should be able to create a temporary
de-centralized user group where he/she can send invitations
to other users involved in the event. One of the important
factors is the fact that only those invited users should be able
to register without any chance of fabrication. Some users of
this group would also be reluctant to reveal their location
so that they should be assured of anonymity protection.
Another challenge would be to provide temporary access to
some personals for any specific event, i.e. company wants to
hire a beautician overseas for some particular event held in
that country or city. Hence various user profiles should be
maintained, and security levels for these profiles should not
be compromised.
1) Business analysis-fashion industry: There is a substan-
tial drift between the requirements of the mobile based use-
case presented above and traditional online alternatives for
these types of requirements. There is not any famous online
social network dedicated for the requirements of the fashion
industry, and most of the media companies have to depend
heavily on human-resource departments or individual personal
to manage the majority of the fashion events, including photo
shots, media interactions, etc. The public figures from the fash-
ion industry also have to compromise between two extremes of
using traditional public social networks or interacting privately
with their colleagues, family or friends. Moreover, celebrities
have a tendency of being tentative to reveal their identity to
unknown online users. Finally, the requirements discussed in
our use case can’t be managed by any online social network
like location tracking, privacy protection, authentication for-
warding, direct mode, etc.
2) Technological aspect: The use case poses a challenge for
existing security, media sharing, content distribution standards
and bringing these technologies together for realizing mobile
social networks. It requires a networking online portal that is
accessible by mobile units. It is evident that membership is
restrictive as compared to traditional online social networks.
Hence the portal must provide strong security guaranteeing
that:
 Only invited members can join the network after strong
identification and verification mechanism. If registration
is triggered by some other member in direct offline mode,
then secure identification and authentication procedures
for device pairing should be implemented.
 There must be a strong authentication mechanism for
user verification. Moreover, in case of identity service,
the overall system delay must remain under some well-
defined threshold limits.
 All communication between portal, fix or mobile ter-
minals should be protected using confidentiality and
integrity protection mechanisms.
 Content storage and distribution mechanisms should be
applied to prevent information leakage.
 User privacy must be ensured such that it should not
be possible for the non-group members to identify any
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Figure 1. Generic Bootstrapping Architecture
particular group members or their locations. Furthermore,
there should not be any possibility for non-group mem-
bers to identify that a certain communication exchange is
performed with a particular group or some specific users
within that group.
 Fine grain access control should be supported to allow
easy management of user roles and prevent illegal access
to services and information within groups.
B. Generic Bootstrap Architecture
GBA has been specified by 3GPP for providing secure
bootstrapping functionality between user equipment, mobile
network operators and various application servers. The main
advantage of the scheme is to reduce the client effort for
managing multiple authentication profiles for different types
of mobile applications along with improved levels of secu-
rity. The old standard that uses mobile equipment to store
authentication details was referred as GBA ME, while the new
GBA U standard stores these credentials on the Subscriber
Identity Module (SIM) or what is referred as USIM in 3G/4G
networks. Although there are lots of changes among the old
and new standard but backward compatibility is ensured. GBA
do not provide single sign-on service like OpenID but the
basic idea is to securely authenticate mobile users for various
application servers by using pre-shared security information
among Mobile Network Operators (MNO) and the end-users.
GBA relies on 3GPP Authentication and Key Agreement
Protocol (AKA) to authenticate peers and to agree on session
keys between clients and application servers. There are five
entities that are involved in the GBA authentication as shown
in Fig. 1.
 UE (User Equipment): The client handset.
 BSF(Bootstrapping Server Function): The BSF is respon-
sible for communicating with UE from the network side.
The UE performs authentication with BSF maintained by
MNO. The UE and BSF mutually authenticate each other
using the AKA protocol.
 NAF(Network Application Function): The NAF is the
application interface towards the UE. The NAF can be
an internal application service maintained by the MNO
or any external application of choice. In later case, the
NAF must communicate with the BSF using a Zn-Proxy
over the Zn interface. The Zn-proxy is not required if
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Figure 2. Message flow for issuing certificate [5]
both BSF and NAF are on the mutually trusted MNO
network.
 HSS (Home Subscriber System): The HSS stores the
authentication profiles of users for applications known
as User Security Settings (USS) [3]. The NAF fetches
these profiles via BSF.
C. GAA and Issuing of Subscriber Certificates
GBA is a part of the GAA architecture [4]. The GAA archi-
tecture supports two different types of authentication mecha-
nisms, symmetric and asymmetric. Symmetric authentication
is achieved through the GBA schemes we already discussed
above and asymmetric authentication through usage of so-
called subscriber certificates (SSC) [5]. Subscriber certificates
according to GAA are issued in a two steps process, where
the first step is a bootstrapping step using GBA where the
requesting client, and the NAF derive a shared secret. This
secret is in turn used in the certificate issuing process. The
message flow for subscriber certificate issuance (from a PKI
portal taking the NAF role) is illustrated in Fig. 2 and the
different steps are the following:
1) The UE sends an empty HTTP request for a certificate
to the NAF over the Ua interface.
2) The PKI portal/NAF sends an authentication challenge
to the UE.
3) The UE uses its session keys obtained during the GBA
process from BSF and use this secret to send a challenge
response to the PKI portal. Optionally the UE also
sends a so-called Wireless Integrity Module (WIM) [6]
challenge to the PKI portal.
4) The PKI portal verifies the UE response, and if it is
OK, it sends an acknowledgement message to the UE
optionally also containing a WIM response (if a WIM
challenge was received in the previous step).
5) The client sends a PKCS#10 [7] based digested request
for issuance of a new certificate.
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Figure 3. Device pairing using ViDPSec [9]
6) The PKI responds by returning an integrity protected
client certificate. The client stores the obtained certificate
either on the mobile equipment memory (GBA ME) or
in the USIM (GBA U).
D. Device Pairing Protocols
Device pairing over an insecure wireless channel without
the aid of any external link or mutually trusted 3rd party
relies heavily on strong key management and authentication
procedures. The notable solutions for such problems are
suggested by Manual Authentication for Wireless Devices
(MANA) family of protocols. The solutions can be categorized
as: ’using data output of one device as input of 2nd device,
comparing output of both devices and entering same data into
both devices’ [8]. These solutions can provide basic foundation
for secure authentication of two devices in offline mode and
can be easily modified for exchange of certificates and other
services.
One example of a MANA protocol is the Visual Device
Pairing Security Protocol (ViDPSec) [9]. The protocol is used
to establish a shared key between two devices using asymmet-
ric crypto system’s key exchange mechanism. The message
exchanges in the ViDPSec are shown in Fig. 3. Both parties
calculate asymmetric key pair of public (Kc) and private (Kp)
keys along with random numbers N1 and N2. The random
numbers are signed using private key and shared among
devices. In next step public keys are shared to read signed
messages of previous step and both parties calculate sum of
corresponding random numbers. The symmetric encryption
key used for confidentiality for further session is shared in the
next step and decrypted using the already available public key
of the other user. Finally the user manually verifies the Sum
on both devices to complete the authentication procedure [9].
III. DESIGN ASSUMPTIONS AND NOTATIONS
We have based our architecture design upon a set of basic
assumptions, which we list below:
1) The GBA network elements BSF, HSS etc. are assumed
to be trusted by our design.
2) The security profile needed for bootstrapping is managed
by the PKI portal over Zn interface or via a Zn-
proxy in case of foreign network as per 3GPP GBA
specification [3].
3) The MSNP acts as an Certification Authority (CA) and
would extend the GBA based USS for issuing, delivering
and revocation of certificates. This additional set of data
gathered from the user including information related to
certificates structure would be termed as MSNP based
User Security Settings (MUSS). The MUSS is needed to
specify the role of a specific user within various social
groups.
4) The model does not include the format of managing
certificate store at the PKI portal, trust hierarchy towards
operator root certificate etc.
Fig. 4 illustrates the MSNP based secure identification
architecture we propose and the notation (reusing the 3GPP
GAA notations whenever applicable) we use to describe the
architecture:
 Ub Interface: This interface is the primary communica-
tion channel between the UE and the BSF for agreement
of session keys using the AKA protocol.
 Ua interface: The Ua interface represents the secure
channel that is created as a result of a successful GBA
bootstrap over the Ub interface.
 Um interface: This is the new interface that we intro-
duce in the architecture, and it is the interface used for
communication between the UE and the MSNP. It extends
the security association over the Ua interface and support
XML based encryption for identification, verification and
registration of the users.
 MSISDN: Mobile subscriber unique identity number (cell
phone number).
IV. SECURE IDENTIFICATION DESIGN
In this section, we describe our architecture for the secure
group enrolment as well as authentication for mobile social
network groups. The MSNP is the core component, but it only
acts as a central ”registration authority” and the solution allows
as well enrolment and authentication between group members
when no connection to MSNP is available. The solution
comprises an extension of GBA based authentication along
with offline authentication and key exchange mechanisms in
compliance with GAA specification. We have chosen the cer-
tificate based mechanism for performing secure identification
and authentication of a user due to its flexibility.
A. Architecture Overview
Fig. 4 shows the network model for GAA infrastructure
for bootstrapping, certification and its extension to support
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Figure 4. Architectural model for MSNP
MSNP. The solution is based on public/private key pairs and
corresponding certificate signed by the PKI portal managed
by MNO. The solution is built upon the following networking
elements:
 The bootstrapping procedure and agreement on session
keys to be utilized by the MSNP are managed using
standard GBA bootstrapping procedures as defined in
3GPP GBA specification. The PKI portal will manage
certificates as mentioned in 3GPP SSC specification
based on USS and an extension for secure mapping using
local profile information obtained from MSNP.
 The certificates are issued using X.509 version 3 extended
certificate format as mentioned in RFC 3280 [10].
B. User Certificate Enrolment
The MSNP will issue three certificates for identification,
verification and maintaining status profile within each social
group. The basic requirements and the type of certificates
issued to manage these demands within the solution can be
summarized as:
 Every MSNP user will be issued one identity certificate
for secure identification. Let us call this AuthCert A,
AuthCert B etc. (for user A, B).
 The user should be able to verify different service re-
quests etc. To ensure this, every user will be issued a
signing certificate, SignCert A, SignCert B etc. (for user
A, B).
 The MSNP registered user and holder of identity and
signing certificates can be a part of more than one social
network. Moreover the user might have different roles
within different networks and these roles may change
over time. So each user also has an additional certificate
for verification of his/her membership and specific role in
different groups. This certificate includes all groups that
the particular user is a member of and the status of the
UE
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Figure 5. Registration flow for new user
group. This certificate will be referred as SocialCert A,
SocialCert B etc. (for user A, B). The SocialCert must
also contain pointers (One-way hash over the complete
certificate or just the public key) to the AuthCert and
SignCert. To enhance the privacy in offline authentication
mode, the user can also maintain separate SocialCert for
each group he/she is a member off.
C. New registration and the creation of a new social group
Next, we describe our proposed procedure for the creation
of a new social group. The procedure is illustrated in Fig. 5
and can be summarized as:
1) The UE will start a secure TLS session with the client
using an installed browser plug-in or a client application.
MSISDN should be used as client id for initiation of
secure identification procedure.
2) The MSNP will verify the identity of the UE to establish
that it is a new user or an existing MSNP user. In
case of a new user, it will forward the UE request for
registration along with MSISDN to the local PKI/NAF
for verification of authenticity. The PKI portal will then
send a certificate request message to the UE.
3) The UE will check the supported certificate list men-
tioned in certificate request message and reply with an
empty response (UE can reply with operator AuthCert
if it already holds such certificate in its certificate
store). The PKI/NAF will then initiate a bootstrapping
procedure and request the UE to start a GBA based
authentication procedure. Next, the UE and BSF will
mutually authenticate each other over Ub interface and
derive session keys using AKA protocol as mentioned
in 3GPP TS 33.220 [3].
4) The UE will respond to the PKI/NAF with the B-TID
obtained via the GBA process in the previous step. The
BSF will validate this B-TID with the BSF over Zn
interface (via the Zn proxy in case of foreign network)
as mentioned in 3GPP TS 33.220.
5) If the client is authenticated, then the client will be
issued new authentication and signing certificates signed
by the PKI portal according to the 3GPP TS 33.221 [5]
specification using X.509 certificate structure.
6) The PKI/NAF will update the MSNP application over
the Zn interface and the user registration process will be
completed. Furthermore, the user will be able to create
a new social group with an active status. In this case,
a new social network with unique name/ID is created
and the MUSS is updated with the MSISDN of the UE,
which will take the moderator role of the newly created
social network group.
7) The MSNP generates the SocialCert and sends it over
Um interface to the user.
8) The MSNP will securely interact with the UE to allow
the user to use that social network group.
D. Secure authentication of registered users
The registered users of the MSNP already contain unique
MSISDN for the MSNP and are holders of authentication and
signing certificates. The users that are member of any social
group would have an additional social certificate stored in
their equipment or USIM using the procedure described in
the previous section. The users should be able to:
 Perform mutual authentication with MSNP using Au-
thCert issued by the PKI using TLS handshake.
 Access services of those social groups that he/she is
already member off by using the SocialCert after estab-
lishment of secure connection with MSNP.
E. Online invitation to new members
The suggested procedure for online invitation of new mem-
bers is shown in Fig. 6 and it can be summarized as:
1) The moderator performs mutual authentication with
MSNP using the authentication certificate (AuthCert)
issued by the PKI over an HTTPS connection.
2) The moderator has the group access through the social
certificate of the group that he/she moderates. The
moderator of the group can either explicitly invite new
members using MSISDN or by searching the interface
provided by the MSNP. The entry of invited user will
be updated in the database.
A similar request of any registered but un-authorized user (not
moderator of that specific social group) will be marked as
invalid by the MSNP after validating Role ID with Group ID
using MUSS.
F. Joining procedure for user invited in online mode
The moderator of one social network is entitled to allow
new users to enter a group and create their appropriate profile
which may vary from group to group depending on the settings
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Figure 6. Online invitation flow initiated by moderator
and applications support in each group. The procedure used
by the MSNP to authenticate an already registered client, says
’B’, is shown in the steps 4-6 of Fig. 6 and can be summarized
as:
1) The invited user authenticates itself using AuthCert B.
2) The MSNP will validate the client and the request will
be mapped by the database to confirm invitation status
by the moderator and valid lifetime of that particular
request.
3) The client will be routed to perform GBA based au-
thentication as shown in Fig. 5 to generate new keys
and update its SocialCert B.
4) The user will generate the certificate signing request
using updated keys and send it to the MSNP.
5) The MSNP updates the SocialCert of the client and
includes the membership of that particular group.
G. New group creation by already registered members
The registered users of MSNP can:
 Securely perform mutual authentication using AuthCert
issued by PKI over the HTTPS connection.
 The users (regardless moderator or member) of one group
can opt to create a new group by following the procedure
mentioned in Fig. 5. The user and PKI should re-negotiate
cryptographic keys using GBA to mutually authenticate
each other and fetch session keys for updating the So-
cialCert.
 The MUSS for a specific group is updated and the client
will store the updated social certificate on its UE or
USIM.
H. Secure Identification in offline mode
With respect to direct offline communication between
MSNP clients, we consider the following two situations:
 Both parties are registered users of the MSNP and hold
authentication certificates. One of the two users is a
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Figure 7. Offline authentication procedure for non-registered users of
particular group
moderator of some social group and willing to invite the
other user to join his/her closed group in the offline mode.
 In this case, both users have been already registered to
the same group and want to mutually authenticate each
other in the offline mode using a client application.
1) Offline invitation by a moderator: The authentication
flow for inviting a new member to MSNP and client enrollment
in MSNP database is depicted in Fig. 7. Suppose user A, who
is a moderator of group N want to invite user B who is the
registered user of MSNP for another social network group.
The steps in this procedure can be summarized as:
 Both parties (A and B) will perform mutual authentication
as shown in Fig. 7 using any device pairing protocol along
with AuthCertA and AuthCertB respectively.
 The user A will sign a special-purpose XML (or any
other compatible format) encoded invitation structure say
’InStruct N’, using the SignCert A. The user A sends
the complete invitation encrypted by MSNP public key
containing:
1) ID of group N
2) Role ID (Assigned role of user within the group N)
3) Nonce (Time Stamp)
4) SignCert A
The user B should have online communication with MSNP
prior to its communication with other members of the invited
social network group for successful completion of the reg-
istration process and obtain its updated SocialCert B from
the network operator of MSNP. Whenever the user B goes
online, it authenticates itself with MSNP (using AuthCert B)
and present InStruct N for verification. The MSNP will push
user B for GBA bootstrap procedure as defined in 3GPP
33.223 [11] specification. Next, the PKI portal will complete
the GBA bootstrapping procedure with the BSF over Ub
interface and perform mutual authentication using the Zn
or the Zn-proxy interface. The user is added to the social
network N with the role defined by inviting user, and the social
certificate of user B (Social- Cert B) is updated to include
membership in the group N.
2) Offline authentication of users belonging to same group:
The users who are already registered to the same mobile social
network within MSNP can authenticate each other by the
following procedure:
Figure 8. Prototype Architecture
 Both parties will perform initial authentication using
corresponding MSNP authentication certificates.
 The users will then use social certificates for verification
and offline connectivity as they are part of one social
group. The social certificate of each user will also deter-
mine its corresponding role within the group.
V. PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION
This section briefly describes the prototype implementation
that we have done using the solution discussed in the previous
section. The software and hardware requirements can be
categorized as:
 Application Language: HTML, CSS, PHP 5.3
 Operating System: Windows, Linux
 Protocols: HTTPS (SSL)
 Web Server: Apache (2.2.11)
 Database: MySQL
All the cryptographic keys and Certificates Signing Requests
(CSR’s) are generated at client side. The prototype server on
the other hand is creating all the corresponding certificates,
database storage etc. Following hardware is used for the
smooth execution of prototype especially at the client end
while using 2048 bit RSA keys:
 X86 based core i5 Processor
 4GB of RAM
 500 MB of free space on storage media
A. Platform and Requirements
The prototype architecture is shown in the Fig. 8. The web
based prototype functionality is primarily based upon two
software modules (API’s) supported by PHP [12].
 OpenSSL module of the PHP uses OpenSSL functions
for creation of x.509 certificates, confidentiality and in-
tegrity of data. The key pair generation, CSR’s, X.509
based certificates, data encryption, decryption, hashing
and SSL based communication tunnel is supported by
using various functions of this API.
 The PHP socket extension is primarily based on the
most widely implemented BSD sockets interface. The
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) was chosen for the
client/server communication in offline mode due to its
reliability.
VI. DISCUSSIONS
Next we discuss our solution and in particular, our prototype
implementation and analyze the solutions from an informa-
tion security perspective. The security of solution primarily
depends on access control mechanisms to guard keys and
certificate storage both at the client and the server. The com-
plete connection setup and subsequent sessions are strongly
authenticated, and the communication is carried out in secure
tunnel using SSL. The secure connectivity covers:
1) User authentication in online mode
2) Server authentication by corresponding certificates
3) Access authentication in offline mode using ViDPSec
A. Security Analysis
Our proposed architecture utilizes well established 3GPP
standards for the enrolment of users to the MSNP as well
as for the issuing of group certificates. Hence, the risks of
compromised protocols or networked based attacks are low.
However, this is only true as long as the client implementation
also applies careful end user authentication, and platform
based credentials for access control mechanisms. The design
and implementation of such a mechanism are outside the scope
of the current paper. The security of the MSNP depends on its
deployment and necessary means for protecting it from both
the network based and direct physical attacks.
The security of the off line invitation is dependent upon the
ViDPSec security. However, alternative MANA protocols can
be used and still be compatible with our suggested architec-
ture. Furthermore, the ViDPSec protocol can be replaced with
a very close proximity wireless communication interface such
as NFC, in which case the risks of direct wireless attacks are
low and there is much less need for manual authentication of
the group invitation communication.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated the security issues with
respect to the design of a secure identification infrastructure
for so call closed social groups. Selecting a concrete use case
as the starting point, we have identified the most important se-
curity requirements for such scenario’s and conclude that these
are indeed different from what one expects from the widely
used open social groups. Based on these requirements, we
have defined a secure identification architecture based on the
3GPP GAA architecture. This architecture allows mobile users
equipped with USIM to securely enroll, create and manage
social groups through an MSNP portal function in the mobile
operator network. In addition, we have investigated how to
align general online group management with offline group
invitation and authentication. This will allow quick, secure
and user convenient invitation to new group members through
interaction with users who are close by. The basic mechanisms
and protocols have been implemented in a prototype system
depicting the feasibility of the proposed design. The suggested
architecture shows the power of the GAA standard framework
in a social network context. The work also shows how basic
security (confidentiality, access control and integrity) can be
achieved while additional important security aspects such as
end user privacy have been left for the future research.
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